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THE PILOT IN COMMAND AND THE FARS:
THE BUCK STOPS HERE (ALMOST ALWAYS)
RAYMOND C. SPECIALE† AND BRETT D. VENHUIZEN††

The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) make it clear—the pilot in
command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and acts as the final
authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.1 However, the regulations are
often silent on several significant questions that frequently arise in the context of pilot in command responsibility. First, who is the pilot in command
when more than one pilot occupies the cockpit? Also, is the pilot in command responsible when a qualified and capable second in command commits an error? Is the pilot in command responsible for knowing whether his
aircraft is being operated with any latent defects that might impact the
aircraft’s airworthiness? Can more than one qualified pilot in the cockpit be
held responsible for FAR violations? The purpose of this article is to
explore these questions and provide guidance for those faced with the question of pilot in command responsibility under the FARs, and, specifically,
in the context of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) enforcement
proceedings.
I.

WHO IS THE PILOT IN COMMAND?

In most cases it is relatively easy to determine the person responsible as
pilot in command of an aircraft. The FARs generally define the term “pilot
in command” as the person who (1) has final authority and responsibility
for the operation and safety of the flight; (2) has been designated as the
pilot in command before or during the flight; and, (3) holds the appropriate
category, class, and type rating, if appropriate, for the conduct of the flight.2

†
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1. 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (2006).
2. 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2006).
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For commercial flight operations requiring Part 1213 or Part 1354
certification, the regulations require the designation of a pilot in command
for the flight. For Part 135 flights, the 135 certificate holder must designate
a pilot in command and “a second in command”5 for flights that require two
pilots.6 Once designated, the pilot in command of a Part 135 flight remains
the pilot in command at all times during that flight.7 For Part 121 flights,
the minimum pilot crew is two pilots and the Part 121 certificate holder
must designate one pilot as pilot in command and the other pilot as second
in command.8
For operations under Part 91 9 of the FARs, the question of who is pilot
in command can be simple in some cases and more complex in others. In
circumstances where a pilot flies without another pilot, either solo or with
passengers, that pilot is obviously acting as the pilot in command. 10
However, the situation can become a bit murky under certain
circumstances. The cases where controversy over who has pilot in command responsibility has typically arisen in the following Part 91 situations:
1. Flights where a certified flight instructor (CFI) is in the
cockpit;11
2. Two pilots operating an aircraft with dual-controls when both
pilots are qualified to operate the aircraft as pilot in
command;12
3. Flights simulating instrument meteorological conditions13
requiring a safety pilot;14 and,
4. Checkrides with FAA examiners.15
3. 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.1-121.1007 (2006).
4. Id. § 135.1-135.443.
5. As defined in 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2006).
6. 14 C.F.R. § 135.109(a) (2006).
7. Id. § 135.109(b).
8. Id. § 121.385(c). Unlike 14 C.F.R. § 135.109(b), the language in Part 121 does not
indicate that once designated, the pilot in command remains as pilot in command throughout the
flight. Id.
9. Id. § 91.1-91.713.
10. Fed. Aviation Decisions, Interpretation 1982-4, I-588, I-591, Letter from J.E. Murdock
III, Chief Counsel to The Honorable Thomas N. Kindness (May 12, 1992) (on file with the North
Dakota Law Review).
11. See discussion infra Part I.A.
12. See discussion infra Part I.B.
13. Defined in the FAA’s Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) as meteorological
conditions expressed in terms of visibility, distance from cloud, and ceiling less than the minima
specified for visual meteorological conditions. Fed. Aviation Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., AIM
Official Guide to Basic Night Information and ATC Procedures (2006), available at
www.faa.gov/atpubs.
14. See discussion infra Part I.C.
15. See discussion infra Part I.D.
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A. CFI IN THE COCKPIT
The certified flight instructor (CFI) carries a heavy burden when it
comes to the question of who is pilot in command of an aircraft. The
National Transportation Safety Board (hereinafter NTSB or the Board), in
one of its earlier cases clearly states that regardless of who is manipulating
the controls of an aircraft during an instructional flight, the CFI is always
deemed to be the pilot in command.16 The Board even goes so far to state
that it makes no difference what level of proficiency a student may have
attained, the flight instructor is still the pilot in command.17 The Board’s
rationale is that a flight instructor’s function on an instructional flight is to
teach.18 If he or she allows the flight to enter a situation that compromises
safety, the CFI has breached his or her duty as pilot in command.19
Although the general rule is fairly clear-cut, there are several cases that
demonstrate how difficult it can be to apply the rule in all situations. What
happens when there are two instructors on board for an instructional flight
and one of them expressly and unequivocally declares herself to be the pilot
in command? The NTSB responded by holding that the instructor who
declared herself to be the pilot in command is indeed the pilot in
command.20 In this case, the Board determined that “any certified pilot,” let
alone an experienced instructor, such as the respondent, would have constructive knowledge of the term “pilot in command” and would understand
the import of taking responsibility for the flight as pilot in command.21
Another situation that raises questions is where the certified flight
instructor does not hold a current medical certificate. In Administrator v.
Ridpath22 the FAA sought the revocation of Ridpath’s pilot and flight
instructor certificates for careless and reckless operations and for operating
an aircraft while intoxicated.23 The facts of the case indicate that Ridpath
was instructing a rated pilot while the pilot was practicing an approach
under simulated instrument conditions.24 Ridpath did not hold a medical
certificate.25
During the practice approach, the aircraft crashed
16. Admin. v. Hamre, 3 N.T.S.B. 28, 31 (1977).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Admin. v. Funk, 6 N.T.S.B. 1016, 1017 (1989).
21. Id.
22. N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3736 (Nov. 13, 1992).
23. Ridpath, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3736 at 2.
24. Id. at 3.
25. Id. at 5 n.4 (noting that under the FARs, a flight instructor instructing a rated pilot need
not hold a medical certificate). It is noteworthy that Ridpath’s lack of a medical certificate would
have legally precluded him from acting as pilot in command in any circumstance. See also Fed.
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approximately 75 feet short of the intended runway.26 Just before the crash,
Ridpath pulled back on the yoke of the aircraft in an attempt to either avert
a crash or minimize its impact.27 The NTSB held that the action taken by
Ridpath to avoid the accident demonstrated an “involvement in the management of the aircraft that [was] sufficient to support the [careless or reckless]
allegation.”28 Interestingly, a separate concurrence by one Board member
indicates that “[a]lthough I agree with the result in this case, I have a
serious problem to the extent that the analysis suggests that respondent has
violated the FARs because he manipulated the controls in an emergency
attempt to reduce the severity of the accident.”29 The concurrence goes on
to reason that the problem was not that the flight instructor manipulated
aircraft controls while under the influence, but that the flight instructor
placed himself in a situation where he was responsible for manipulating the
controls at a time of necessity while under the influence of alcohol.30
The question arises as to whether the Board is de facto imposing a
strict liability standard on CFIs for all student errors. The answer appears
to be “no.” In Administrator v. Strobel,31 the flight instructor was asked by
an experienced pilot to accompany the pilot on a “check-out” ride in an
aircraft type that the pilot had never flown before.32 The check-out was not
legally necessary because the pilot had already been checked out in an
aircraft of similar category and class.33 During the flight, the pilot applied
full power after a touch-and-go landing and then, inexplicably and without
any warning, reduced power and jammed on the brakes of the aircraft with
only 300 feet of runway remaining.34 The airplane could not stop in the remaining runway, broke through a fence, and continued for another 400 feet
until stopping in a corn field.35 The NTSB held that the flight instructor
was clearly acting as a flight instructor during this flight even though his
presence was not required.36 However, the Board refused to impose strict
liability on the flight instructor.37 The Board reasoned that although flight
Aviation Decisions, Interpretation 1989-24, I-251 Letter from Donald P. Byrne, Acting Assistant
Chief Counsel to Bruce J. Brotman (Sept. 13, 1989) (on file with the North Dakota Law Review).
26. Ridpath, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3736 at 3.
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 7 (Hart, concurring).
30. Id.
31. N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4384 (Jul. 18, 1995).
32. Strobel, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4384 at 3.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 4-5.
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id. at 7.
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instructors are expected to do everything possible to keep a flight safe, they
are not to be held strictly liable for the outcome of a flight.38
B. TWO QUALIFIED PILOTS AND DUAL CONTROLS
One common scenario in light general aviation aircraft are two
qualified pilots in an aircraft cockpit with dual controls. This raises some
interesting questions: Who is the pilot in command under these circumstances? Can a pilot who believes that he or she is on board a light general
aviation aircraft as a passenger only, be held responsible for FAR violations
that arise from that flight? This situation can easily arise in a variety of
contexts involving light aircraft. There are many situations where a pilot
(and even a non-pilot) might help with non-flying chores such as radio
communications, map-reading, and changing frequencies on navigation
aids.39 In fact, the FAA and industry experts encourage single pilots to
make use of the resources (both human and machine) available to lighten
their workload.40
In a 1995 decision, Administrator v. Thomas,41 the NTSB responded to
these questions in a somewhat muddled way. But, the case still provides
some valuable guidance. The Thomas case came about as a result of an
incident involving a close shave with a barely-avoided, gear-up landing.42
The aircraft involved was a Swearingen Merlin II, a twin engine turboprop
airplane certificated for single-pilot operations.43
In this case, Thomas was the employer of the pilot in command who
was doing the flying from the left seat of the aircraft cockpit.44 On the day
of the incident in question, the airplane was being flown to pick up a
potential purchaser for a demonstration flight.45 Thomas claimed that he
took along his employee to act as pilot in command because he did not
assess himself to be current in the aircraft.46 Thomas and his employee
took turns flying on the different legs of the flight.47 At the time of the

38. Id.
39. Telephone Interview with Bruce Landsberg, Executive Director of AOPA Air Safety
Foundation (Aug. 12, 2007) [hereinafter interview with Bruce Landsberg].
40. Id.; see also NBAA Training Guidelines for Single Pilot Operations of Very Light Jets
and Technically Advanced Aircraft, available at http://web.nbaa.org/public/ops/safety/vlj/1.php.
(last visited March 19, 2008).
41. Thomas, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4309 (Dec. 14, 1994).
42. Id. at 3.
43. Id. at 3 n.4.
44. Id. at 3.
45. Id. at 5 n.7.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 3.
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incident in question, Thomas was the non-flying pilot who was working
radios, calling checklists, sometimes working the flaps and propeller
controls on the aircraft, and calling out altitudes.48
The near gear-up incident took place while the aircraft was executing
an instrument approach.49 During an initial attempt to land the aircraft, the
employee who was flying the aircraft lowered the gear handle, but the gear
did not deploy.50 As the employee began his landing flare, Thomas noticed
that the cockpit’s gear-down lights were not lit.51 He alerted his employee
and the employee executed a go-around with resulting damage to the aircraft’s propeller and antennae which both struck the runway.52 The employee returned for a second landing attempt and landed without further
incident.53
The FAA charged Thomas with careless and reckless operation of an
aircraft54 and the NTSB affirmed the FAA’s charges, suspending Thomas’s
pilot certificate for fifteen days.55 One of the many interesting aspects to
this decision by the NTSB is the Board’s stated understanding that Thomas
was not being punished as if he were the responsible pilot in command.56
Instead, the Board stated that the sanction against Thomas stemmed from
his “own behavior.”57 The Board clarified in its decision that simply
because “an aircraft requires only one pilot does not support a conclusion
that a second pilot (or even a non-pilot) participating in the inflight operations is not accountable for his own actions.”58 The Board expressly agreed
with the decision by its administrative law judge that it was not necessary to
determine that Thomas was the pilot in command.59
This decision is problematic at best because it fails to clarify how a
second pilot or even a non-pilot could be held liable for the careless or
reckless operation of an aircraft when they are not legally responsible (or in
the case of the non-pilot, not capable of legal responsibility) for the conduct
of the flight. However, notwithstanding this unanswered question, the

48. Id. at 5-6.
49. Id. at 3.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1.
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 5.
59. Id. at 8. However, the Board thought it important to point out that the employee flying
the aircraft testified as to his perception that Thomas was the pilot in command. Id.
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Board does provide some helpful guidance when it comes to the question of
determining the pilot in command when you have two qualified pilots in a
cockpit with dual controls. The Board stated:
[W]e think it [is] important to point out that [the employee pilot’s]
perception that [Thomas], who was qualified in the aircraft, was
the PIC is not an unexpected assumption and that good cockpit
crew management requires that two pilots in a cockpit agree prior
to the flight as to the duties of each. The need for such agreement
is not limited, as [Thomas] argues to those situations where the
aircraft specifications and procedures require two pilots. [Thomas],
as pilot and [the other pilot’s] employer, could have chosen to
have no role in the aircraft’s operation, could have clearly told [his
employee] that he was the PIC, or could have stated his intent to
perform certain functions and no others.60
While this guidance might be helpful, it may still be impractical in
most cases involving light aircraft requiring only a single pilot. It may be
argued that this type of ruling may even produce a chilling impact on air
safety because it will make “second pilots” think twice before offering any
assistance during a flight. Nonetheless, this decision does in fact focus
attention on this rather murky area of the FARs and the need to be as clear
as possible when determining who is responsible as pilot in command of an
aircraft operation.61
C. SAFETY PILOTS
Pilots regularly operate in simulated instrument conditions in order to
train as instrument rated pilots or maintain skills as instrument pilots.
While one pilot is “under the hood,” the FARs require the other pilot to act
as a “safety pilot.”62 Two questions frequently arise in this context. First,
who is the pilot in command while the aircraft operates in simulated
instrument conditions—the pilot “under the hood” or the safety pilot? The
second question is what qualifications, if any, does the safety pilot need to
possess?
FAR Section 91.109(b) does not directly respond to the question of
who acts as pilot in command of the flight during simulated instrument
conditions. However, FAA interpretations indicate that if a pilot who is not
instrument rated is flying an aircraft under a hood and simulating
60. Id.
61. See also Admin. v. Deville, 3 N.T.S.B. 3789 (1981); Admin. v. Fields, 4 N.T.S.B. 512
(1982).
62. 14 C.F.R. § 91.109(b) (2006).
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instrument flight under instrument flight rules (even while operating in
visual meteorological conditions), the safety pilot must act as pilot in
command and must also hold an instrument rating appropriate to the aircraft
being operated.63 In such circumstances, the safety pilot is considered pilot
in command and must hold a current airman medical certificate.64
Relevant FAA interpretations indicate by inference that if the pilot
“under the hood” is current and instrument rated, that pilot can serve as
pilot in command.65 Alternatively, if instrument flight is being simulated
under visual flight rules, the pilots could agree prior to the flight as to which
pilot will serve as pilot in command. Further, as long as the safety pilot
does not act as pilot in command, he or she is not required to comply with
the currency requirements of FAR Section 61.57.66
D. CHECKRIDES
As discussed above, when a student pilot is undergoing training, the
student’s certified flight instructor is considered the pilot in command
during every dual flight.67 This is most obviously the case with a student
who has not yet obtained a private pilot certificate.68 But what happens
when a student pilot or candidate for a higher certificate or rating shows up
for a checkride with an FAA inspector or designated examiner?
FAA regulations tackle this issue directly. First, the regulations state
that an examiner represents the FAA for purposes of administering a flight
exam to determine an applicant’s fitness to hold a certificate or rating.69
Next, the regulations expressly state that the examiner is not the pilot in
command of an aircraft during a checkride unless the examiner agrees to act
in that capacity through prior agreement with (1) the applicant or (2) a
person who would otherwise act as pilot in command of the flight or a
portion of the flight.70
This raises another question—if the examiner is not pilot in command,
is he or she considered to be a passenger on board the aircraft? If so, that

63. Fed. Aviation Decisions, Interpretation 1985-12, I-63, I-64, Letter from Carol S.
Rayburn, Manager, General Aviation and Commercial Division, to John J. Sheehan (June 17,
1985) (on file with the North Dakota Law Review).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Admin. v. Hamre, 3 N.T.S.B. 28 (1977); see also FAA Interpretation 1985-12, supra
note 64, at I-64.
68. However, a student pilot who has soloed may be considered a pilot in command when
they are operating the aircraft on solo training or cross country flights.
69. 14 C.F.R. § 61.47(a) (2006).
70. Id. § 61.47(b).
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might make a checkride for a private pilot applicant or recreational pilot
applicant illegal because a non-private pilot would not have passenger
carrying privileges.71 The regulations address this issue by indicating that
during any checkride, the applicant and the examiner are not held subject to
any other regulatory requirements or limitations related to the carriage of
passengers.72 This provision essentially clears the way for the checkride
with a pilot in command and an examiner who has a special status by virtue
of not being considered a passenger or a crewmember with responsibility
for the conduct of the flight.
II. PILOT IN COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIRCRAFT
OPERATIONS AND DEFENSES
While it is sometimes difficult to identify the pilot in command, the
duty and responsibility of the pilot in command is pretty clearly spelled out
in the FARs. The FARs plainly state that the pilot in command of an
aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.73 The rule appears to leave little room for discussion—
the buck stops with the pilot in command. If anything untoward occurs
during a flight or if any rules are violated, it is the pilot in command who
will need to atone. Despite the sweeping language suggesting a strict
liability standard, there are three widely recognized exceptions to the rule.
A. REASONABLE RELIANCE DEFENSE
The first exception is known as the reasonable reliance defense. This
defense does not have its roots in the regulations. It emanates from NTSB
Board (and several earlier Civil Aeronautics Board or CAB 74) decisions.
Essentially, the reasonable reliance defense permits a pilot in command to
avoid liability if he or she reasonably relied on a second in command who
errs.
From the earliest CAB cases, it was recognized that a pilot in command
of a transport aircraft is not necessarily accountable for the failure of crew
members where it is shown that his reliance on those crewmembers was
reasonable.75 In later cases, the NTSB explained the rationale for this
exception to the general rule for command pilots. In Administrator v.

71. Id. § 61.89(a).
72. Id. § 61.47(c).
73. Id. § 91.3(a).
74. The CAB was the predecessor to the NTSB.
75. Admin. v. Dillon, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4132, at 5 n.10 (Apr. 7, 1994) (citing Charles
A. Hazen, 26 C.A.B. 824, 829 (1958)).
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Lusk,76 the Board indicates that while the responsibility for the safe operation of an aircraft rests with the pilot in command, it must be recognized
that the complexity of air travel and technology requires that duties be
delegated and not individually confirmed by the pilot in command. 77
Therefore, an airline captain could not be required to personally verify
every representation made to him by any member of ground or flight
crews.78
This general approach to the reasonable reliance defense continued for
many years until the NTSB articulated a far more specific rubric for
applying the defense in Administrator v. Takacs.79 In the Takacs case, the
Board established a significantly narrower standard that is still in use today.
Specifically, the Board articulated the new standard as follows:
As a general rule, the pilot-in-command is responsible for the
overall safe operation of the aircraft. If however, a particular task
is the responsibility of another, if the PIC has no independent
obligation (e.g., based on operating procedures or manuals) or
ability to ascertain the information, and if the captain has no
reason to question the other’s performance, then and only then will
no violation be found.80
As indicated, the new test requires three ingredients in order for the
Board to consider the reasonable reliance defense:
1. The task is the responsibility of another;81
2. The PIC has no independent obligation to ascertain the
information; and,
3. The PIC has no reason to question the performance of the
crewmember.
In subsequent cases, the Takacs test has made it significantly more
difficult to employ the reasonable reliance defense. In Administrator v.
Doreen,82 the Board concluded that the reasonable reliance defense could
not be applied because the pilot in command had an independent obligation
to repeat a clearance out loud (and because the pilot in command had the
ability to determine the correct clearance).83 The Board also refused the

76. 2 N.T.S.B. 480 (1973).
77. Lusk, 2 N.T.S.B. at 481.
78. Id. at 482.
79. N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3501 (Feb. 1, 1992).
80. Id. at 9.
81. It is noteworthy that this test has the effect of requiring that the crewmember relied upon
must be a necessary crewmember under the FARs.
82. N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4778 (June 30, 1999).
83. Doren, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4778 at 2-4.
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reasonable reliance defense to a pilot in command when the Board determined that a reasonably prudent pilot would not assume that his second in
command would correctly enter an altitude.84 Another example of the
narrowing of this defense comes in the case of Administrator v. Buboltz,85
where the Board found that a pilot in command failed to meet the requirements of the Takacs test due to the fact that he had reason to question his
first officer’s characterization of a clearance, and the opportunity to ascertain whether his flight was cleared.86 The most recent rejection of a reasonable reliance defense is found in Administrator v. Jolly.87 In this case,
the Board was not persuaded that the reasonable reliance defense applied
because the respondent did not establish that he did not have the ability to
determine whether his co-pilot had complied with an airspace NOTAM
(notice to airmen).88
Some safety questions arise as a result of the Board’s tighter requirements for utilizing the reasonable reliance defense. One prominent point of
concern is whether the Board’s legal policy is congruous with FAA’s
efforts to encourage the use of crew resource management (CRM), which
refers to the effective use of all available resources during a flight: “human
resources, hardware, and information.”89 FAA’s push for greater crew
coordination and delegation of duties stems from its observations that many
incidents and accidents are caused by “poor group decisionmaking, ineffective communication, inadequate leadership, and poor task or resource
management.”90 Safety experts point out that narrowing the use of the
reasonable reliance defense could be counterproductive to safety due to the
possibility of regression to the 1970s and 1980s cockpit environment when
a first officer merely served as a back-up and the captain was always
assumed to be correct.91

84. Admin. v. Nutsch, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4148 at 6 (Apr. 13, 1994), aff’d, 55 F.3d 684
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
85. N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3907 (June 7, 1993).
86. Buboltz, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3907 at 2.
87. N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5307 (August 9, 2007).
88. Jolly, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5307 at 10-12.
89. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 120-51E,
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TRAINING 2 (Jan. 22, 2004).
90. Id. at 4.
91. Interview with Professor Jim Higgins, Dep’t of Aviation, John D. Odegard Sch. of
Aerospace Science, Univ. of N.D. (May 9, 2007); see also Interview with Bruce Landsberg, supra
note 40.
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B. EMERGENCY AUTHORITY OF PILOT IN COMMAND
The second exception is applicable in the case of an inflight emergency. The FARs permit a pilot in command, when facing an inflight emergency requiring immediate action, to deviate from the rules to the extent
required to meet the emergency.92
The first issue that arises in the use of a pilot’s emergency authority is
clarifying what is meant by the term “emergency” as it is used in the
regulations. FAA interpretations indicate that an emergency will generally
be recognized in “unexpected [or] unforeseen serious occurrence[s] or
situation[s] that require[] prompt, urgent action.”93 However, the Board
has, in certain circumstances, rejected arguments by the FAA that there can
only be an emergency when “immediate” action is required.94 The Board
has also been willing to permit the invocation of emergency authority when,
in hindsight, no abrupt action by the pilot in command was necessary.95
Another issue that frequently arises in cases where a pilot in command
invokes emergency authority is the need to declare an emergency. The
NTSB Board has clearly ruled on this issue—the fact that a pilot does not
formally declare an emergency on his radio does not preclude reliance on
FAR Section 91.3(b) as exculpatory.96 However, a review of NTSB Board
decisions makes it clear that the declaration of an emergency will be treated
as circumstantial evidence that an emergency situation truly existed.97 It is
also important to note that the Board will not recognize the exercise of a
pilot’s emergency authority when the emergency is one of the pilot’s own
making.98
The FARs also provide for some administrative burdens on pilots who
find it necessary to deviate from the rules due to an emergency. As a
general operating rule, a pilot who invokes FAR Section 91.3(b) must, upon
92. 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(b) (2006).
93. Fed. Aviation Decisions, Interpretation 1993-10, I-26, I-28, Letter from Donald B.
Byrne, Assistant Chief Counsel, Regulations Division to Mr. George K. Schaefer (Apr. 16, 1993)
(on file with the North Dakota Law Review). The FAA has also issued guidance on particular
types of emergencies. See also Fed. Aviation Decisions, Interpretation 1990-39, I-356, I-357,
Letter from Donald B. Byrne, Assistant Chief Counsel, Regulations and Enforcement Division to
Gerald L. Naekel (Nov. 23, 1990) (on file with the North Dakota Law Review) (discussing major
fires and natural disasters); Fed. Aviation Decisions, Interpretation 1979-38, I-373, I-374, Letter
from Johnathan Howe, Deputy Chief Counsel to Joseph M. Schwind (July 9, 1979) (on file with
the North Dakota Law Review) (pertaining to fuel supply, weather conditions, and icing
conditions).
94. E.g., Admin. v. Scott, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4003 at 4 (Oct. 27, 1993).
95. Admin. v. Owen, 3 N.T.S.B. 854, 856-57 (1977).
96. Admin. v. Clark, 2 N.T.S.B. 2015, 2017 n.8 (1976).
97. Scott, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4003 at 4-5.
98. See Admin. v. Teti, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3969 (Aug. 12, 1993) at 8; Admin. v. Worth,
N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3595 (June 2, 1992) at 7 n.15.
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the request of the FAA, file a written report of the deviation to the FAA.99
A pilot operating under Part 121 of the FARs must abide by more detailed
requirements requiring that:
Whenever a pilot in command or dispatcher exercises emergency
authority, he shall keep the appropriate ATC facility and dispatch
centers fully informed of the progress of the flight. The person
declaring the emergency shall send a written report of any
deviation through the certificate holder’s operations manager, to
the Administrator. A dispatcher shall send his report within 10
days after the date of the emergency, and a pilot in command shall
send his report within 10 days after returning to his home base.100
Pilots operating under Part 135 of the FARs have a somewhat similar
requirement mandating that anyone deviating from a rule in Part 135 due to
an emergency must:
[W]ithin 10 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and Federal
holidays, after the deviation, send to the FAA Flight Standards
District Office charged with the overall inspection of the certificate
holder a complete report of the aircraft operation involved,
including a description of the deviation and reasons for it.101
In the end analysis, a deviation from the regulations due to an
emergency may be excused. However, the emergency must be genuine and
not of the pilot’s own making. Additionally, the pilot invoking emergency
authority must be prepared to properly document the circumstances surrounding the emergency and subsequent deviation.
C. CONTROLLER ERROR DEFENSE
The third widely recognized exception is where a pilot reasonably
relied on an air traffic controller who makes an error. Much like the
reasonable reliance defense, the controller error defense does not have its
roots in the regulations. It is largely based on NTSB Board decisions and
interpretations.
Long standing Board precedent makes it clear that a pilot’s violation
(typically of an air traffic control clearance) may be excused if ATC is the
initiating or principal cause of the deviation.102 This precedent was

99. 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(c).
100. 14 C.F.R. § 121.557(c).
101. Id. § 135.19(c).
102. E.g., Admin. v. Snead, 2 N.T.S.B. 262 (1973); Admin. v. Nelson and Keegan, 2
N.T.S.B. 1900 (1975); Admin. v. Dunkel, 2 N.T.S.B. 2250 (1976); Admin. v. Smith, 3 N.T.S.B.
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amplified (and to some extent clarified) in Administrator v. Fromuth and
Dworak103 when the Board explained that even if a deviation from a
clearance is initiated by a pilot’s inadvertent mistake, the mistake may be
excused if after the mistake, the pilot takes action that, but for ATC, would
have exposed the error, thus allowing ATC to correct the error.104 As long
as there is no evidence that a pilot misheard a clearance or instruction due to
carelessness or lack of professionalism, a full readback of the misunderstood clearance to ATC that goes uncorrected by ATC will exonerate the
pilot(s) involved.105 The Board plainly indicates that it views the readback
as an intention to ensure that compliance with ATC instructions or
clearances is based on an accurate understanding of the clearance or
instruction.106
All of this is somewhat muddled with a significant United States Court
of Appeals decision in Garvey v. NTSB.107 In Garvey, the pilot in command
of a Northwest Airlines flight mistakenly thought that an instruction to an
American Airlines aircraft was intended for his flight.108 The Northwest
pilot made a full readback of the clearance to ATC; however, his transmission was entirely blocked or “stepped on” because it was made at the
same time the American Airlines pilot was making his readback.109 Due to
the fact that ATC never received the readback from the Northwest pilot, it
could not correct his mistake and he went on to deviate from his clearance
which triggered a violation.110
The NTSB was persuaded that the Northwest pilot had done everything
he could to ensure a correct understanding of the clearance he was given.
Therefore, the Board dismissed the FAA enforcement action against the
pilot.111 In doing so, the Board rejected the FAA’s interpretation of its
regulations that “[i]nattention, carelessness, or an unexplained

85 (1977); Admin. v. Rolund, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3991 (Sept. 27, 1993), reconsideration
denied Order EA-4123 (Mar. 17, 1994), aff’d, 57 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
103. N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3816 (Mar. 5, 1993).
104. Fromuth & Dworak, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3816 at 6-7.
105. See Admin. v. Atkins & Richards, EA-4078 (Feb. 16, 1994).
106. Admin. v. Fromuth & Dworak, EA-3816 (Mar. 5,1993); see also FAA Order 7110.65,
Air Traffic Control, Section 2-4-3 (Feb. 16, 2006). “If altitude, heading, or other items are read
back by the pilot, ensure the read back is correct. If incorrect or incomplete, make corrections as
appropriate.” FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 2-72 (1993).
107. 190 F.3d 571 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
108. Id. at 574.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 575.
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misunderstanding . . . [does] not excuse a deviation of a clearly transmitted
clearance or instruction.”112
On appeal, the FAA argued that the NTSB had a statutory obligation to
defer to its interpretation (developed as a litigation position during the
proceedings).113 The Court of Appeals agreed with the FAA and reversed
the NTSB’s decision to exonerate the pilot.114 It is uncertain if the impact
of this case is limited to its unusual facts, i.e. that the pilot’s readback was
totally blocked. However, it is worthy to note its holding and the more
overarching ruling regarding deference to FAA interpretations (even those
developed during litigation).115
III. PILOT IN COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR AIRCRAFT
AIRWORTHINESS
The FARs clearly state that no person may operate an unairworthy
aircraft116 and that “a pilot in command of a civil aircraft is responsible for
determining whether that aircraft” he or she is operating is in airworthy
condition.117 Further, the pilot in command is required to discontinue a
“flight when unairworthy mechanical, electrical, or structural conditions
occur.”118
While this regulation appears straightforward, it does raise some
practical questions regarding application. A pilot may be responsible for
determining aircraft airworthiness, but is that liability absolute? Can a pilot
reasonably rely on the maintenance logbook entries prepared by FAA certified maintenance personnel? What if an aircraft begins a flight in airworthy
condition and an unairworthy condition develops that the pilot does not
notice? Just how far does the pilot in command’s responsibility extend
when it comes to aircraft maintenance and airworthiness?
Some guidance on these issues is provided by NTSB decisions. The
first set of cases address the issue of whether a pilot can rely on maintenance entries prepared by FAA certificated maintenance personnel in
determining whether an aircraft is airworthy. The second set of cases
112. Id.
113. See 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(3) (stating that the Board is “bound by all validly adopted
interpretations of laws and regulations the Administrator carries out . . . unless the Board finds an
interpretation is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not according to law”).
114. Garvey v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 190 F.3d 571, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
115. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 152-53
(1991) (holding that courts must defer to interpretations of the Secretary of Labor rather than those
of the OSHRC in split enforcement regime under the Occupational Safety & Health Act).
116. 14 C.F.R. § 91.7(a) (2006).
117. Id. § 91.7(b).
118. Id.
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discusses a pilot’s responsibility to detect and properly respond to an
unairworthy condition that occurs during a flight.
A. REASONABLE RELIANCE ON MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL
As indicated above, before every flight, the pilot in command must
make an assessment of whether his or her aircraft meets airworthiness standards.119 However, with the complexity of aircraft systems and the inability
of a pilot to make that determination without assistance from qualified
maintenance personnel, the question becomes whether a pilot in command
can reasonably rely on qualified maintenance personnel to determine
whether his or her aircraft is airworthy. Most pilots and lawyers would like
to think the answer to this question is “yes.”
However, the wording of the FARs is clear: “No person may operate a
civil aircraft unless it is in an airworthy condition.”120 The words of this
regulation were interpreted rather strictly in an early NTSB decision where
an FAA inspector examined an aircraft approximately one month after its
annual inspection, finding a number of substandard maintenance items that
he believed rendered the aircraft unairworthy.121 In discussing that case, the
NTSB stated:
The fact that some of the discrepancies might not have been detect[ed] on a normal walk-around inspection by a pilot prior to
flight, and the fact that the aircraft had passed an annual inspection . . . [a month prior], do not excuse respondent from its responsibility, as the operator, for the airworthiness of the aircraft.122
Obviously, the standard created by this case is very close to a strict liability
standard—even though a pilot in command might not be able to detect a
maintenance deficiency, they are still held responsible if a deficiency exists.
In later cases, the NTSB reconsidered this strict liability approach.
Perhaps, the first case articulating the current standard applied is
Administrator v. Hanley.123 In Hanley, the pilot was flying cargo in a fortyyear old Beech D18 between Miami, Florida, and Freeport, Grand
Bahama.124 During a routine ramp inspection in Miami, an FAA inspector
cited the aircraft with several maintenance discrepancies.125 The pilot

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id. § 91.7(a).
Admin. v. Golden Eagle Aviation, Inc., 1 N.T.S.B. 1028 (1971).
Id. at 1032.
3 N.T.S.B. 1773 (1984).
Id. at 1777.
Id.
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informed his employer of the deficiencies cited by the FAA inspector and
his employer instructed him to taxi the aircraft to a repair station that did all
the maintenance work on this aircraft.126 After the pilot was notified that all
necessary repairs had been made, he performed a preflight inspection, took
notice that the repairs were made and noted in the maintenance logbooks,
and flew a cargo mission.127 Upon his return to Miami, the FAA inspector
was waiting for him, and determined that the repair station had not made all
the necessary repairs.128 The FAA sought a sixty-day suspension of
Hanley’s airman certificate.129 Ultimately, the Board reduced the sanction
to ten days, preserving a finding of a regulatory violation against Hanley.
Most importantly, the Board noted that the pilot did everything his
employer requested and that he could reasonably believe, based on his
employer’s advice, that the repair station had properly completed its
work.130 The Board went on to state:
We are satisfied . . . that the [pilot] . . . could reasonably assume
that the aircraft was airworthy [on the date of the flight in question] based on his employer’s advice that the repair facility had
completed the work on his own observations, during preflight,
concerning the previously noted deficiencies. . . . In these circumstances, we think that the respondent did not act imprudently or
unreasonably in relying on his employer’s assurances that the
work had been properly done.131
This case and subsequent cases appear to lead to the application of a
standard of reasonableness when attempting to resolve a question of whether a pilot in command is responsible for an aircraft’s unairworthy condition.
In Administrator v. Olsen,132 the Board specifically stated that it was not
imposing a standard of strict liability when holding that a pilot in command
knew or should have known about an unairworthy condition.133 Determining just what a pilot should have known is often the question that hinges
on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In Administrator v.
Nielsen,134 a pilot contended that he appropriately relied on the assumption
that a mechanic would have informed him if his aircraft was unsafe to

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id. at 1777-78.
Id. at 1778.
Id. at 1774.
Id.
Id.
N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3743 (Nov. 23, 1992), aff’d, 14 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 4-5.
N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3755 (Dec. 16, 1992).
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fly.135 However, the Board disagreed, reiterating that it is the pilot in
command’s ultimate responsibility, to determine whether his aircraft is
airworthy.136 In this case, the Board specifically determined that even if the
pilot did not know that a broken carburetor heat control cable rendered his
aircraft unairworthy, he should have known that the cable was necessary to
getting carburetor heat and, therefore, to the safe operation of his aircraft.137
Thus, at the end of the day, the standard that a pilot in command will
be held to is whether he knew or reasonably should have known that his
aircraft was unairworthy.138 Further, it is important to note that FAR
Sections 91.7(a) and 91.7(b) are to be treated differently when analyzing
pilot in command responsibility. Section 91.7(a) lays out a pilot’s responsibility to determine airworthiness before operating an aircraft. Section
91.7(b) addresses pilot responsibility once an aircraft is in flight.139
B. UNAIRWORTHY CONDITIONS DEVELOPING INFLIGHT
In Administrator v. Hedayat-Zadeh,140 the FAA sought the suspension
of Captain Zadeh’s airline transport certificate for thirty days for operating
an unairworthy aircraft.141 The FAA also charged Captain Zadeh with careless or reckless operations endangering the life or property of another.142
This case involved an interesting set of facts and circumstances.
Captain Zadeh was the non-flying pilot in command of a Boeing 747
passenger carrying flight from Gardermoen Airport in Oslo, Norway, to
John F. Kennedy Airport in New York City.143 Due to the short runway at
the departure airport, Captain Zadeh decided to perform a static takeoff in
which the brakes of the aircraft are not released until the engines produce
full thrust.144 Apparently, the high thrust of the engines caused large portions of the runway pavement behind the aircraft to break up and strike the
aircraft, causing substantial damage to the tail section of the aircraft.145 At
least three flight attendants observed asphalt chunks of runway blow up
from the ground at the rear of the aircraft and one of the flight attendants

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Admin. v. Yialamas, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5111 (Sept. 20, 2004), at 6-7.
See Admin. v. Naypaver, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4127 (Mar. 17, 1994).
N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3918 (June 10, 1993).
Id.
Id. at 2; see also 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2006).
N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3918 (June 10, 1993) at 2.
Id.
Id. at 2-3.
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reported hearing “a loud bang as the asphalt hit the fuselage.”146 The
airport tower controller informed the cockpit crew that “you blew up the
asphalt layer in the very south end of the [runway] and there was coming
debris after you.”147 However, the focus of the tower was on whether the
aircraft tires had been damaged during the takeoff.148 Unaware of the
substantial damage to his aircraft, Captain Zadeh continued the flight to
New York uneventfully with the aircraft showing no sign of damage.149
Upon arrival in New York, however, it was apparent that the aircraft was
seriously damaged.150
The FAA argued that the information provided to Captain Zadeh
should have alerted him to the fact that the aircraft was possibly
unairworthy.151 The FAA relied on long-standing Board precedence found
in Administrator v. Dailey152 and Administrator v. Parker.153 In both of
these cases, the Board held that a pilot could be held responsible if it was
determined that a reasonable and prudent pilot would have concluded from
available information that the aircraft he was operating was or had become
unairworthy.154
In the Zadeh case, both the law judge and the NTSB found that the
facts did not support a finding that Captain Zadeh knew or should have
known that his aircraft had sustained damage and become unairworthy.
The NTSB based its finding on the lack of clarity in communications between the flight attendants and the cockpit crew and the airport tower.155
The Zadeh case demonstrates that while the pilot in command is
ultimately responsible for discontinuing a flight if unairworthy conditions
arise during the flight, the pilot in command’s liability is not absolute. It
must be found that a reasonably prudent pilot either knew, or should have
known, that an unairworthy condition existed.156
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the fundamental legal principles in aviation is that the pilot in
command is ultimately responsible for the safety of the flight. This basic
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
3 N.T.S.B. 1319 (1978).
3 N.T.S.B. 2997 (1980).
Id.; 3 N.T.S.B. 1319 (1978).
N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3918 (June 10, 1993) at 6.
See id.
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tenet is of primary importance whenever a pilot is faced with an
enforcement action by the FAA.
However, there are occasions where it is not so easy to identify the
pilot in command. While clear identification can be made in most air
carrier cases where two pilots (a pilot in command and second in command)
are required, the lines may start to blur when two pilots are within reach of
the controls in flights governed by Part 91 of the FARs. Circumstances
involving flight instruction, two qualified pilots at the controls, and safety
pilots during simulated instrument flights are some of the most common
situations where we need to turn to cases and FAA interpretations for
guidance. In the end, it is the person who truly acts as the pilot in
command, the person who actually exercises command authority, who is
indeed the pilot in command. Where a person is seated in the aircraft, and
even whether a person lacks qualifications, is not necessarily relevant in the
determination of who is the pilot in command.
Even though a pilot is deemed to be responsible as pilot in command or
second in command, there are still defenses that are recognized by
regulation and NTSB case law. Most of these defenses can be characterized
as “reasonable reliance” defenses. The question that often needs to be
answered in this context is whether the pilot reasonably relied on other
crewmembers, air traffic controllers, maintenance personnel, or his or her
own observations regarding aircraft performance and airworthiness either
preflight or during flight. In other cases, the pilot might be able to establish
an emergency authority defense. In these cases it is important to determine
if the emergency was created by the pilot’s own actions. If not, was the
pilot’s action in response to the emergency prudent and reasonable? In the
end, the general rule usually prevails. The buck stops with the pilot in
command—almost always.

